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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
APPELLATE PRACTICE-NOTICE OF APPEAL-APPEALS FROM JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE COURT-[Missouri].-Suit originated in Justice of Peace Court where
judgment was given for the plaintiff. From this judgment the defendant
appealed to the circuit court. Notice of appeal was served on plaintiff's
attorneys but the record did not show that they were the attorneys who
had appeared for the plaintiff in the justice's court. Plaintiff filed a motion
to affirm the judgment which motion the circuit court sustained. Held, on
appeal, that the statute relating to notice of appeal' was not complied with
as it did not appear that the notice of the appeal was served on plaintiff
or the attorneys who appeared for the plaintiff in the justice's court. Judg-
ment affirmed. Carsten v. Coon.2
This case expressly states that the rule of strict construction should be
followed with regard to statutory provisions for appeals from judgments of
the justices of peace. However one of the cases, Ellis v. Kyes,3 cited as a
basis of strict construction on this point, was decided on a more substantial
basis than the principal case. It was there held that the notice was not
good as the proper person was not served, but the evidence heard on the
motion to dismiss established the fact that the attorneys served had not
appeared in the justice's court. Yet in the principal case it was not defi-
nitely established that the attorneys served did not appear in the justice's
court.
That the notice should contain certain particulars has been pointed out
in various cases.4 The case of Comstock v. Packing Co.5 laid down four
essentials which are:
"(1) designate names of parties to the suit; (2) give correct date ofjudgment of the justice of peace appealed from; (3) correctly desig-
nate and describe what judgment was appealed from; (4) must be
signed by the party appealing or his agent or attorney."6
The notice in the principal case was valid in these particulars for it con-
tained the judgment, date, parties, and appellant's signature. The purpose
of the statute is to convey information to the adverse party that the appeal
is being taken.7 There was in the instant case the actual admission that
these attorneys were at the time of notice the plaintiff's attorneys, and that
1. R. S. Mo. 1939 §2741.
2. (Mo. App. 1942) 163 S. W. (2d) 1052.
3. (1891) 47 Mo. App. 155.
4. Tiffin v. Millington (1834) 3 Mo. 418; McGinniss & Ingels Co. v.
Taylor (1886) 22 Mo. App. 513.
5. (1913) 171 Mo. App. 410, 156 S. W. 815.
6. Comstock v. Packing Co. (1913) 171 Mo. App. 410, 420, 156 S. W.
815, 818; State v. Hammond (1902) 92 Mo. App. 231; Clay v. Turner
(1909) 135 Mo. App. 596, 116 S. W. 480; Smith Drug Co. v. Hill (1895) 61
Mo. App. 680; Igo v. Bradford (1905) 110 Mo. App. 670, 85 S. W. 618.
7. In Schuchart v. Brasler (Mo. App. 1923) 249 S. W. 164, 167, the
court said: "The purpose of the notice is to notify; that is, to inform the
appellee of the fact that an appeal has been taken in the case."
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consequently when the notice was served on them the plaintiff had at least
implied notice that an appeal was being taken. His appearance in the
appellate court shows that the notice was sufficient in fact.
An opposite result in the case might be justified on another ground.
Since the statute deals with notices of appeals it might be interpreted in
the light of another statute8 on notices. The latter statute states that the
service of a notice on the attorney of a person constitutes service on that
person. So the sentence of the statute in the principal case which reads
"or by delivering a copy of the same to the appellee"' ) could be interpreted
as validating the service on the appellee even though made on his attorneys.
Liberally construed the statute is remedial in its nature and there is no
need for legislative action to change its harshness; a judicial decision could
interpret it correctly without overstepping judicial powers.1 o Thus it seems
that the principal case was decided on a technicality which by liberal con-
struction of the statute would be removed without changing its meaning or
purpose. M.A.H.
CIVI POCEDU-APPELAT PRACTIc--BIIMW OF EXCEPTMONS-[Mis-
souri].-Respondent, within ten days after the service of appellants' ab-
stract, filed written objections questioning the failure of the abstract to
show the filing of the motion for new trial and the bill of exceptions. Ap-
pellants refused to amend their original abstract. Held: Appeal should be
dismissed on ground that the record proper was insufficient to show error.
Brown -v. Reichmann.1
The above failure to grant an appellate review on the merits is in accord
with the strict and technical distinction now recognized in Missouri be-
tween the record proper and the bill of exceptions.2 Prior to the develop-
ment of the art of stenography and the use of official court reporters, oral
proceedings were not immediately and officially preserved. The bill of ex-
ceptions made by the attorney himself, and later signed by the court, was
therefore a necessary and proper method of recording that which other-
wise would exist only in memory.3 In 1825 the Missouri Legislature codi-
fied,4 with some moderate changes, the common law and equity principles
concerning the record proper and the bill of exceptions, and for 117 years
our courts have given force to the distinction even though now, as provided
by statute, oral proceedings are officially recorded5 and the dependency on
memory no-longer provides a reason for the rule of decision.
As a consequence of the changed conditions, many states as well as the
8. R. S. Mo. 1939 §910.
9. R. S. Mo. 1939 §2741.
10. Hender v. Ring (1895) 90 Wis. 358.
1. (Mo. App. 1942) 164 S. W. (2d) 201.
2. R. S. Mo. 1939 §§1174, 1175. Wallace v. Woods (1936) 340 Mo.
452, 102 S. W. (2d) 91.
3. Williams, Appellate Practice (1942) 7 Mo. L. Rev. 158, 161-163.
4. Mo. Laws of 1825, 631.
5. R. S. Mo. 1939 §13295.
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